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ARTICLES 
INTERMARKET COMPETITION  
AND MONOPOLY POWER  
IN THE U.S. STOCK MARKETS 
Roger D. Blanc* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Stock exchanges in the United States have undergone dramatic change 
in the last several years. Their conversion from not-for-profit entities 
controlled by their members into for-profit, publicly owned corporations 
over which their former members have substantially less influence and 
control has significantly altered the initial regulatory assumptions that allow 
stock exchanges to be self-regulatory organizations. The introduction of 
electronic trading media put substantial pressure on floor-based exchanges 
and encouraged stock exchanges to embrace electronic technology. The 
new profit incentives and ease of transferring information in the age of 
electronic communications led the exchanges to begin marketing the 
quotation and trading data their members were required by law to give 
them. The exchanges are now using the data entrusted to them as self-
regulatory organizations to further their new profit-seeking objectives. 
In response, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
substantially revised its regulation of the markets in light of several of these 
changes, yet its revised regulations consistently appear to be one step 
behind the exchanges, which have used their regulatory revenues to serve 
private, for-profit ends rather than the ends the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (Exchange Act) envisions. This article reviews some of the effects of 
those changes on market structure and on market participants, including the 
effects on “fragmentation” of the markets. A particular concern is that a 
result of the exchanges’ profit-seeking structure has been to foster the 
creation of a two-tiered market where large investors are charged market 
data fees beyond the means of smaller investors and then given faster access 
to that data, thus granting them substantial trading advantages. The article 
then reviews the current debate over the revenues the exchanges are 
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attempting to collect by selling depth-of-market data, and the recent petition 
by NetCoalition.com seeking to overturn the SEC staff’s approval of certain 
NYSE Arca market data fees. That petition strikes at the heart of the 
revenues exchanges collect. It has sparked a vigorous debate and challenges 
the staff’s use of its delegated authority to approve exchange rule changes 
setting market data fees. 
II. THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE U.S. STOCK MARKETS 
There was a time not very long ago when fragmentation of the U.S. 
stock markets was thought to arise from having separate market centers. It 
was a time when trading resided mostly on physical exchange floors and in 
the offices of over-the-counter dealers. In fact, the SEC may have helped 
promote fragmentation in 1941 when, in the Multiple Trading Case,1 it 
forbade the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) from preventing its 
members from trading in NYSE-listed securities on other exchanges. 
Indeed, the exchanges’ “off board trading rules,” chiefly the now-rescinded 
NYSE Rule 390 (formerly Rule 394), severely limited the ability of NYSE 
members to trade NYSE-listed stocks in the over-the-counter market.2 
The time when physical exchange floors dominated equity trading in 
the United States began to draw to a close in the 1970s. In 1975, the 
Congress directed the SEC to use its authority under the newly amended 
Exchange Act to foster the establishment of a national market system 
(NMS). It cast serious doubt, moreover, on whether off-board trading rules, 
such as NYSE Rule 390, would continue to have a place in the new 
system.3 It was not until the late 1990s, however, that the SEC responded to 
that call and directed the NYSE to abandon its off-board trading rule.4 But 
                                                                                                                 
 1. In the Matter of The Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, 10 SEC 270, 297 (Oct. 4, 
1941) (holding that the NYSE rule prohibiting dealings on other markets is against public interest 
and illegal). 
 2. See Order Approving Proposed Change to Rescind Exchange Rule 390, Exchange Act 
Release No. 42,758, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,175 (May 5, 2000) (approving the NYSE rescission of Rule 
390). See also Andrew M. Klein & Andre E. Owens, The Intermarket Trading System: 
Reassessing the Foundation of the National Market System, WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM,  
Mar. 2000, at 1. 
 3. Exchange Act § 11A(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(2) (2000). The Congress added this 
section to the Exchange Act as part of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-
29, 89 Stat. 113. 
 4. See Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at Columbia Law School: Dynamic Markets, 
Timeless Principles (Sept. 23, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/ 
1999/spch295.htm [hereinafter Levitt 1999 Speech]. 
This rule has long prohibited NYSE members from dealing in listed securities off an 
exchange. For years, proponents have argued that Rule 390 prevents fragmentation. 
Others contend that the rule is an anticompetitive use of market power by a dominant 
market. As I see it, Rule 390 may very well be on its ninth life. Now is the time to ask 
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what then happened? In fact, trading in the NYSE-listed stocks, if anything, 
became more concentrated on the NYSE as its market share grew by a 
small amount to over 80% before later settling back to under 70%.5 
Did any of that have to do with increasing or decreasing market 
fragmentation? If market fragmentation is taken, erroneously this writer 
believes, to mean dispersion of order flow among competing market 
centers, then concentrating trading on the NYSE would diminish frag-
mentation, and diversion away from that market center would increase it. 
That, however, is not fragmentation in today’s context. 
The SEC correctly views efficient markets as resulting from the 
exposure of all buying interest to all selling interest, and vice versa, 
regardless of how that exposure occurs. 
The NMS is premised on promoting fair competition among individual 
markets, while at the same time assuring that all of these markets are 
linked together, through facilities and rules, in a unified system that 
promotes interaction among the orders of buyers and sellers in a particular 
NMS stock. The NMS thereby incorporates two distinct types of 
competition—competition among individual markets and competition 
among individual orders—that together contribute to efficient markets. 
Vigorous competition among markets promotes more efficient and 
innovative trading services, while integrated competition among orders 
promotes more efficient pricing of individual stocks for all types of orders, 
large and small. Together, they produce markets that offer the greatest 
benefits for investors and listed companies. Accordingly, the 
Commission’s primary challenge in facilitating the establishment of an 
NMS has been to maintain an appropriate balance between these two vital 
forms of competition.6 
In fact, increasing competition among market centers will no doubt 
promote innovation while rewarding efficiency and punishing inefficiency. 
In a system of electronically interconnected markets where order-entry 
firms can use “smart” order-routing technology to route and, as necessary, 
                                                                                                                 
ourselves: is there a valid justification for a rule that appears to be more a barrier than a 
benefit? And how, under any circumstances, could such an anticompetitive rule be 
sustained should the NYSE become a for-profit corporation? While rulemaking is 
certainly an option, one way or another, Rule 390 should not be part of our future. 
Id. See also Order Approving Proposed Change to Rescind Exchange Rule 390, 65 Fed. Reg. at 
30,175. 
 5. See Gaston F. Ceron, NYSE’s Market Share In Its Listed Stocks Falls, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 
2007, at C5 (finding the NYSE share of the securities market peaked at eighty percent); see also 
Historical NYSE Group Monthly Volume, available at http://www.nyse.com/financials/ 
1143717022567.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2007). 
 6. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,503 (June 
29, 2005). 
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re-route orders in search of the best sources of liquidity and best prices, it 
matters far less than it once did how many markets there are or whether any 
single market center becomes or remains dominant. In place of the 
traditional assumption that having multiple market centers quoting and 
trading the same securities meant the market was fragmented is the new 
reality that, given the relatively low cost of bandwidth, a system of elec-
tronically interconnected market centers competing for order flow both 
permits orders to be shunted back and forth in search of liquidity and price 
and promotes economic efficiency and investor choice. 
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt recognized this in a speech at Columbia 
Law School when he extolled the virtues of the then relatively new 
phenomenon of electronic communications networks (ECNs), which had 
begun to erode the market share Nasdaq enjoyed in Nasdaq securities. He 
stated: 
Electronic communication networks have been one of the most important 
developments in our markets in years—perhaps decades. But exactly what 
are ECNs, and what are we to make of their impact on our markets? In 
simplest terms, ECNs bring buyers and sellers together for electronic 
execution of trades. They have provided investors with greater choices, 
and have driven execution costs down to a fraction of a penny. As a result, 
these networks present serious competitive challenges to the established 
market centers. More fundamentally, they illustrate the breath-taking pace 
of change that results when technology and competition coalesce.7 
A number of regulatory changes had promoted an environment in 
which technology could begin effectively to challenge the control over 
order flow previously enjoyed by the exchanges. The establishment of 
Nasdaq itself at the end of the 1960s signaled the beginning of the new era. 
Originally, Nasdaq was just a quotation medium—a way to shine light in 
the dark corner of over-the-counter trading where market efficiencies were 
all but absent and dealers were not easily put in competition with one 
another. Over time, however, with further prodding from the SEC, Nasdaq 
grew into an automated system that involved publication to investors and 
not just dealers of the “inside inside,” that is, the best available bids and 
offers (instead of the earlier “representative bid and asked” that gave a far 
less accurate indication of what the best prices actually were)8 and a 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See Levitt 1999 Speech, supra note 4. 
 8. See, e.g., Order Approving Proposed Reporting Plan for NASDAQ/NMS Securities Traded 
on an Exchange on an Unlisted or Listed Basis, submitted by the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, Inc., and the American, Boston, Midwest and Philadelphia Stock Exchanges, 
Exchange Act Release No. 28,146, 55 Fed. Reg. 27,917, 27,917 (July 6, 1990). 
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quotation montage—called for by Exchange Act Rule 11Ac1-2 (now Rule 
603 of Regulation NMS)9—that showed investors the available alternatives. 
The dealer community, however, found an alternative. Instinet offered a 
way for dealers to put better quotations on a private system available only 
to a favored institutional clientele without offering the same pricing to other 
dealers and the retail public.10 That of course contributed to a two-tier 
market, with the institutional investors getting preferred treatment.11 
Whether that made sense from the point of view of public policy was more 
debatable. On one hand, retail customers tend to think they should get the 
same pricing as institutional investors regardless of the different costs of 
servicing them—just as many retail consumers buying automobiles would 
doubtless be upset if they knew of the better pricing offered to large buyers 
such as the major automobile rental companies. Getting to the bottom of 
that issue may depend, it seems, on how to resolve the question of who is 
the small investor: the retail individual, such as a doctor, lawyer, or 
corporate executive who buys a few hundred shares at a time, or the large 
pension fund or mutual fund that buys several hundred thousand shares at a 
time on behalf of thousands of indirect investors such as schoolteachers, 
firefighters, and police officers, whose aggregate investments may be quite 
a bit smaller than those of the individual retail investors who invest directly 
through their brokers. 
In any event, the SEC decided that the Instinet game had to end. In 
August 1996, it adopted the Order Execution Rules.12 Chief among their 
provisions were requirements that: (1) broker-dealers making markets in 
publicly traded stocks not quote better prices, or publish customer limit 
orders at better prices, in private networks such as Instinet unless they 
adjusted their publicly disseminated quotations to match the private ones, 
and (2) unless—and this was an important unless—the private networks 
published the best quotations on their books in their own names in Nasdaq 
or another permissible venue. The dealers could thus continue to quote 
inferior prices under their own names in Nasdaq, but the better pricing they 
were offering via Instinet or other similar media would for the first time see 
the light of day publicly in an anonymous way via the private network’s 
                                                                                                                 
 9. 17 C.F.R. § 242.603 (2006). 
 10. See SEC, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 
1934 REGARDING THE NASD AND THE NASDAQ MARKET (Aug. 8, 1996), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/nasdaq21a.htm; see also In the Matter of National 
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 37,538, Administrative 
Proceeding File No. 3–9056, 1996 SEC LEXIS 2146 (Aug. 8, 1996). 
 11. In the Matter of National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 1996 SEC LEXIS 2146, 
at *2–4. 
 12. See Order Execution Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 37,619A, 61 Fed. Reg. 48,290 
(Sept. 6, 1996). 
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own name. The SEC’s rules required, moreover, that these better quotations 
be accessible by any registered broker-dealer.13 
This regulation was an important, indeed watershed, event for two 
reasons. First, it made it more difficult, although by no means impossible, 
for dealers to publish better pricing in some media than in others. Second, 
and quite possibly more important, it led to the rise of a new class of 
competing electronic communications networks that challenged both the 
hegemony of Instinet among private networks and Instinet’s own market 
share. At the same time, to goad the order-entry brokers into searching out 
the best prices, and possibly to reward dealers who took the risk of offering 
price improvements, the Commission published a release announcing the 
adoption of its Order Execution Rules, including a long discussion of a 
broker’s duty of “best execution.”14 The Commission thus federalized a 
duty previously thought to be a creature of state agency law. The SEC made 
it clear that it would consider it improper, for example, for a dealer to quote 
a bid and asked and to take two customer market orders, one to buy and one 
to sell, and to then execute the customer sell order against the dealer’s bid 
and execute the customer buy order against the dealer’s asked quotation. 
Instead, the dealer would need to execute the customer orders against one 
another, presumably inside the bid-asked spread, giving each a better price 
than it would have received had its order been executed against the dealer 
bid or asked.15 
These steps did much to curtail fragmentation in the Nasdaq market. 
Previously, market makers in Nasdaq stocks had operated pretty much 
independently. There was no public disclosure of the actual “inside inside” 
on Nasdaq and what was published as the National Best Bid and Offer 
(NBBO) did not really represent true best pricing in many securities. With 
the implementation of the new rules, for the first time, the true best prices 
(not including the pricing of block transactions, which were largely 
excluded from operation of the Order Execution Rules) were being 
published and were accessible to any registered broker-dealer. The SEC has 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.602(b)(5)(ii) (2006); see generally id. § 242.604(b)(5) (regarding the 
display of customer limit orders). 
 14. Order Execution Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. at 48,322–24. 
 15. Id. at 48,322–24. The Commission also suggested that a customer limit order executed 
against a customer market order had to receive the limit price (even though a limit order was 
commonly understood to mean “give me a price no worse than my limit price and try to get me a 
better price”). See id. That, of course, made limit orders even more susceptible than otherwise to 
the risk of adverse selection and gave rise to the “not held” limit order—a stratagem introduced by 
the institutional dealers to neutralize the Commission’s unfairly discriminatory treatment of limit 
orders. The not-held limit order was a limit order not held to the market price; its terms provided 
that the broker should try to get the best price possible but in any event a price no worse than the 
limit price. That, of course, was what many had thought—until the SEC spoke to the contrary—
was the implicit or explicit understanding underlying all limit orders. 
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made it clear, as a matter of federal law, that brokers were expected to live 
up to a duty of best execution requiring them to use commercially 
reasonable efforts to get the best available prices for their customers. 
The SEC reinforced that duty a few years thereafter by adopting Rules 
11Ac1-5 (now Rule 605 of Regulation NMS)16 and 11Ac1-6 (now Rule 606 
of Regulation NMS),17 which, respectively, required market centers—
exchanges, electronic communications centers and market makers—to dis-
close information concerning orders executed on their markets and required 
order-entry firms to disclose their order-routing policies and methods. 
Those rules increased the amount of data available to order-entry firms and 
required them to publish how they were taking advantage of the data. 
During this period, another major development affected pricing in the 
markets and the risk of fragmentation—the decimalization of securities 
pricing. Originally quoting prices mostly in eighths of a dollar and then for 
a short time in sixteenths, the exchange markets and Nasdaq were required 
to move to pricing in pennies, producing 100 price points to the dollar 
instead of the previous eight or sixteen. That development had a number of 
implications and adumbrations. Among them, the regulatory provisions 
turning on “tick” tests—whether a trade was above or below the previous 
one—ceased to make any sense and the SEC began to move toward 
deletion of the price test in the short sale rule.18 Also, and more importantly, 
it began to cast doubt on whether getting the best price, down to the last 
penny, was worth the trouble, particularly if it meant incurring the extra 
costs and possible delay inherent in going to several different market 
venues in search of pennies. Finally, it vastly diminished the informational 
value of the best bid and offer since, with 100 price points to the dollar, the 
amount of liquidity apparently available at a market’s best bid or offer was 
a small fraction of what it had been when prices were quoted in eighths or 
even sixteenths. 
Notwithstanding these developments, there always has been some 
ambiguity as to whether a two-tiered market could in fact be eliminated, 
and whether it was sound public policy to require that institutional investors 
not be permitted to use their economies of scale and scope to obtain from 
the markets any special advantages over retail investors. Some, including 
some in Washington, may have believed that all orders should interact with 
all other orders and institutional investors should “walk” the market up or 
down, filling retail orders by the bushel in the process of satisfying their 
gargantuan appetites, much like a baleen whale devouring untold millions 
                                                                                                                 
 16. 17 C.F.R. § 242.605 (2006). 
 17. Id. § 242.606. 
 18. See, e.g., Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, Exchange Act Release No. 
54,891, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,068 (Dec. 7, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242). 
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of plankton. Of course, the institutional investors and their brokers and 
block positioners have long recognized that best execution of institutional 
orders hardly would be achieved in such a fashion. One commented: 
At Fidelity, we have no reason or incentive to by-pass readily accessible 
limit orders in any market where executions are certain and immediate. In 
seeking best execution of large orders, we seek the best overall execution, 
that is, best overall price. Walking the market up or down over several 
minutes or even seconds, if the ability to sweep the limit order book is 
denied, seriously impairs our ability to obtain the best execution for our 
funds. Often, liquidity at prices above or below the NBBO will fade away 
if we have to work our way, over the course of several seconds or minutes, 
above or below the NBBO. That fading away occurs as market 
professionals see us taking up liquidity at the prices nearer to the NBBO 
and then either compete with us for liquidity at the more distant prices or 
withdraw orders they have placed at those prices only to put them further 
away from what had been the NBBO. All of this suggests the markets are 
sufficiently complex that a one-size-fits-all trade-through rule is too 
limiting unless market participants are permitted to opt out of the rule 
when their fiduciary duty or economic self-interest tells them they 
should.19 
Those facts and comments did not fit an idealized picture of a homo-
geneous market where all order flow could interact in an orderly fashion 
and everyone would stand in line and get the same treatment as everyone 
else. In fact, as institutional investors and major dealers know, an “order” 
may not necessarily become an order unless the order entrant has some idea 
of what execution price or prices it might receive. Particularly in the context 
of large orders, factors affecting the overall price an investor received, such 
as the degree to which its buying or selling interest would be kept 
confidential from other players in the market, can exert a profound 
influence on the overall execution price of a large block. That means the 
sophisticated trader is not looking solely at quoted prices in selecting a 
venue to present its orders. Fidelity listed some of the non-price factors it 
considered important: 
• What are the out-of-pocket costs that a market center imposes on 
investors? These may include not only access or transactional fees, but 
also market data costs. Market centers differ in their pricing of 
supplemental market data, that is, market data other than best bid or 
offer quotes and last sale reports. Some markets charge separate fees to 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Letter from Eric D. Roiter, Senior Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Fidelity Mgmt. & 
Research Co., to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (June 22, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/proposed/s71004/sdesano072204.pdf. 
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investors who seek to view the depth of quoted bids and offers—which, 
as the Commission is aware, has become much more important upon 
the introduction of decimalization. Even among markets who charge 
such market-data costs, pricing may vary significantly. From the 
investor’s standpoint, best execution involves not only the price at 
which a security is bought or sold, but other costs which investors must 
pay to enter into and clear their trades. 
• What is the liquidity and depth of any particular market center? Again, 
if a market center charges a fee to an investor for the “privilege” of 
seeing the depth of quotes away from the best bid and offer, should this 
market be viewed by investors as offering liquidity comparable to that 
of another market center that discloses the depth of its quotations for no 
fee or lower fees? 
• What is the quality of a market center’s program of self-regulation? 
How well does a market center monitor the trading activities of its 
members and how strong or consistent is its record of disciplining 
members who violate its trading rules? 
• How fair are the market center’s trading rules? Does a market center 
confer special privileges on some of its members that give them an 
advantage over public investors? 
• How competitive is a market’s own trading venue? For any given 
security, does it allow for competing market makers or does it confer a 
monopoly market-making privilege on a single member? 
• How efficiently, quickly, and reliably does a market center confirm 
trades occurring in its trading venue? The advantage to an investor of 
being able to enter into automated trades on a given market can be 
undermined if confirmations of those trades are marked by delay or 
uncertainty. 
• How quickly does a market center refresh its quoted prices after a trade 
occurs? This is crucial to investors seeking to effect large transactions 
in stages. 
• How well does a market center maintain the anonymity of investors 
placing orders in that market?20 
For other traders, particularly those operating algorithmic trading 
programs that spit out thousands of trades a day in search of minute profit 
opportunities thought to be available only for very short periods of time 
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intra-day, speed is all important. Speed is similarly important in the case of 
trades that involve simultaneously executing orders in a physical stock and 
one or more derivative instruments; there, capturing the spread is all 
important and the actual execution prices is less so.21 
III. WHERE WE ARE TODAY: THE SEC ADOPTION OF 
REGULATION NMS 
The SEC’s response to these various developments, notwithstanding 
vigorous and well-reasoned objection, came in the form of a massive set of 
rules known as Regulation NMS.22 Many of these rules were in fact old 
wine in new bottles, previous rules somewhat recast and renumbered. 
Others broke new ground, such as a prohibition on trading in sub-pennies, 
an access rule, and amendments to joint industry plans. The most significant 
and controversial of these rules was the Order Protection Rule, also known 
as the Trade-Through Rule.23 The SEC apparently was not convinced that 
its 1996 statements about broker-dealers’ duties of best execution24 would 
be sufficient to cause investors to fill publicly displayed limited orders. 
Thus, given the likelihood that sophisticated investors would not be willing 
to wait in line with everyone else but would instead seek to “jump the 
queue” to get greater liquidity at prices somewhat inferior to the NBBO 
(where little liquidity now resides), the SEC pushed over the past objections 
of several major commenters and imposed its Trade-Through Rule.25 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See, e.g., Aaron Lucchetti, Fast Lane: Firms Seek Edge Through Speed as Computer 
Trading Expands, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2006, at A1. 
 22. See Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496 (June 29, 
2005). 
 23. See id. at 37,501. 
 24. See Order Execution Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 37,619A, 61 Fed. Reg. 48,290, 
48,291 (Sept. 6, 1996). 
 25. See, e.g., Letter from Eric D. Roiter, Senior Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Fidelity 
Mgmt. & Research Co., to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Mar. 28, 2005), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71004/edroiter032805.pdf; Letter from Thomas N. McManus, 
Managing Dir. and Counsel, Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Feb. 7, 
2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71004/s71004-754.pdf; Letter from 
Richard M. Whiting, Executive Dir. and Gen. Counsel, The Fin. Services Roundtable, to Jonathan 
Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Feb. 4, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71004/ 
fsrt020405.pdf; Letter from Jeffrey T. Brown, Senior Vice President, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 
to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Feb. 1, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ 
s71004/charlesschwab020105.pdf; Letter from Stewart P. Greene, Chief Counsel, Securities Law, 
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Corporation of America/College Retirement Equities Fund, to 
Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Jan. 16, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ 
s71004/spgreene012705.pdf; Letter from C. Thomas Richardson, Managing Dir., U.S. Equities, 
Citigroup Global Markets Inc., to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Jan. 26, 2005), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71004/ctrichardson012605.pdf; Letter from Kim Bang, 
Bloomberg L.P., to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Jan. 25, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/proposed/s71004/kbang012505.pdf. 
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If it had been adopted in a form that would have protected limit orders 
below the NBBO—below the national best bid or above the national best 
offer—the Trade-Through Rule might have actually achieved its objectives. 
But to do so, the Commission would also have had to mandate that 
exchanges and other market centers publish quotations above and below the 
liquidity displayed at the NBBO. In such a case, a more robust Trade-
Through Rule would have required the protection of published limit orders 
above and below the NBBO, so that a competing market center would have 
to protect not only the best bid or order in a competing market—that is, not 
trade at quoted prices inferior to it—but also not be able, having matched or 
filled that order, to trade through the next best prices in line. 
Such a rule, had it been adopted, might have done much to invigorate 
the competitors of the major markets, particularly the NYSE. At the same 
time, however, unless block trades were exempted,26 it might well have 
disrupted institutional trading and, possibly, driven institutions even more 
toward what are being called “dark pools of liquidity,” which would have 
increased, rather than diminished, fragmentation (in the sense of the failure 
of orders to interact).27 As it happened, though, the Commission was 
lobbied heavily and settled for the current rule, which might be called 
Trade-Through Rule Light. The current rule protects only the top of the file 
in a given market center, even though the liquidity represented by the top of 
the file—that is, the best bid or best offer—may be trivial indeed (especially 
now that stocks trade in hundredths of a dollar). 
As a result, a trader—such as a block positioner—can take out a market 
center’s best bid or offer and then trade through all that market’s liquidity at 
inferior prices. This prevents the Trade-Through Rule from offering any 
substantial limit-order protection. Equally important, the rule does not have 
any notion of time priority and permits a market center to match rather than 
ship. That is, a market center does not have to forward an order to a 
competing market center that was the first to offer price improvement. In 
concrete terms, if the best bid on the NYSE is $X.05 and a bid is available 
at $X.07 on another venue, the NYSE can match the best bid, $X.07, and 
trade at that price even though the same bid had been presented in the other 
market center, possibly long before, the NYSE trade. Effectively, that 
disadvantages someone who took the risk of offering “price improvement” 
                                                                                                                 
 26. The Intermarket Trading System Trade-Through Rule, which (by design) was largely 
unenforced, had a block exception that prevented it from interfering with block trading. The 
Regulation NMS Order Protection Rule does not contain such an exception. 
 27. See, e.g., Aaron Lucchetti, Shares Bought in the Dark, As Large Institutional Investors Use 
Anonymous Trading, Regulators and Small Investors Worry About Pricing, Disclosure, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 9, 2007, at C1; Nina Mehta, SEC New Market Reg Chief Has Dark Pools in Focus, 
TRADERS MAGAZINE, Oct. 30, 2006 (quoting Dr. Erik R. Sirri, Director of the Commission’s 
Division of Market Regulation). 
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by placing a limit-order in a competing market. The party that placed the 
unexecuted limit-order ran the risk of adverse selection—that it would get 
executed only if the market was moving away from it—but was denied an 
execution as a reward for taking that risk.28 
Regulation NMS did serve an important role as a catalyst. Even if it did 
not actually address fragmentation in any meaningful way, the limited 
protections that the Trade-Through Rule afforded were available only to a 
fast market—a market that responds electronically to incoming order flow. 
The NYSE floor members were the last vestige of a physical exchange floor 
in any major securities market in the world—other than the American Stock 
Exchange and options exchanges—and they would be cut out from the 
Trade-Through Rule’s protection. That realization provided an important 
impetus for the NYSE to reform and introduce electronic technology.29 
A. EXCHANGES RESPOND TO REGULATION NMS 
The NYSE’s response—in the form of a “hybrid” market—did a 
number of things. First, it provided for an expansion of a previously trivial 
electronic execution functionality so that it would begin operating alongside 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Since the Regulation NMS so-called Order Protection Rule protects only the best bid and 
the best offer in any trading center, it would require a trading center such as the NYSE to match or 
fill an order at a competing “fast” trading center (e.g., Nasdaq or the Philadelphia Stock 
Exchange) before trading at an inferior price (lower in the case of a bid, higher in the case of an 
offer). Accordingly, if the NYSE specialist filled all the orders at the best quoted price shown in 
each other trading center, it could then trade down to prices that were inferior to the next best 
price or prices on those other trading centers. For example, if the best bid on the NYSE was $X.03 
and the best bids were $X.07 for 200 shares on Nasdaq and $X.08 for 300 shares on Philadelphia, 
respectively (with there being other bids on those exchanges at prices inferior to the best prices 
there), the NYSE specialist could: (a) sell as many shares as it wished at $X.08 without filling the 
Philadelphia order (or of course the $X.07 order on Nasdaq); (b) ship an order to Philadelphia to 
sell 300 shares at $X.08 and then sell as many shares as it wished at $X.07 without filling 
Nasdaq’s $X.07 order or an $X.07 order (if it then existed) on Philadelphia; or (c) ship an order to 
Philadelphia to sell 300 shares at $X.08, ship an order to Nasdaq to sell 200 shares at $X.07 and 
then sell as many shares as it wished on the NYSE at prices below $X.07 even though those sales 
traded through any then remaining better bids (e.g., at $X.06, $X.05, $X.04 . . .) on Philadelphia 
and Nasdaq. Nevertheless, in the case of (c), the NYSE specialist’s best-execution obligations, if 
enforced, may require a different result, one that goes beyond what the Order Protection Rule 
would alone command. 
 29. Other important catalysts include the prosecutions brought against all seven NYSE 
specialist units for frauds, chiefly involving specialists trading for their own accounts ahead of 
customer orders. Some of those prosecutions involved criminal liability and substantial jail time. 
Those actions underscored what many had been saying for some time, that business as usual on 
the NYSE floor was run without reference to the requirements of the Exchange Act. See, e.g., 
David Glovin, Former Van der Moolen Managers Sentenced for Fraud, BLOOMBERG.COM, Jan. 
19, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=arM.tGw8KByI; Edgar 
Ortega, NYSE Fines Specialists $2.8 Million for Violations, BLOOMBERG.COM, Jan. 16, 2007, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=acHH79QEiMCI (reviewing his-
tory in which specialists were fined $247 million in 2004 for similar conduct). 
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the traditional floor. That expansion, combined with the NYSE’s 
acquisition of a major competitor, the Archipelago Exchange (ArcaEx), 
provided the foundation for a new NYSE.30 Second, the NYSE took 
measures to protect the NYSE floor members—principally the specialists, 
but also the floor brokers. There were four principal ways in which the 
NYSE hybrid proposal did this: (i) specialists and floor brokers were able to 
enter what might be called “stealth orders”—that is, orders not visible to 
those off the floor—which were to be given equal priority with pre-existing 
orders from the public; (ii) specialists were given the power to have 
automated matching engines match superior quotations on other venues, 
thus having electronic means for taking advantage of the permission in the 
Commission’s Trade-Through Rule to match such quotations rather than 
provide any reward to external competitors offering price improvement; 
(iii) incoming market orders to buy (sell) that were matchable against 
several limit orders at successively higher (lower) prices were to be given a 
“clean up” price that gave all the limit orders the highest (lowest) price, 
with the result that the market order was severely disadvantaged; and 
(iv) specialists were given the power to halt the operation of the electronic 
market—applying what might be called regulatory air brakes—if certain 
                                                                                                                 
 30. It also eliminated criticism of the NYSE’s conduct by ArcaEx, which had long been 
skeptical about the NYSE’s claim that it actually provided limit order protection. The Archipelago 
Exchange testified that under the then existing Intermarket Trading System Trade-Through Rule, 
the NYSE specialists traded through ArcaEx limit-orders hundreds of times a day without any risk 
of enforcement action by the NYSE: 
   Empirical data shows that the NYSE trots out the trade through rule when it suits 
its competitive purposes, but ignores it when it does not. Here are some facts: ArcaEx 
runs software (aptly named “whiner”) that messages alerts when exchanges trade 
through an ArcaEx quote in violation of the ITS plan. The whiner database reflects that 
ArcaEx customers suffered up to 7,500 trade-through violations in a single week by the 
NYSE. In fact, trade-through violations have actually risen most recently despite the 
glare of the regulatory spotlight on the NYSE. Since just this last . . . fall (2003), the 
annualized cost to investors of the NYSE specialists trading through ArcaEx’s quotes 
has increased 3-fold from approximately $1.5 million to $5 million. On any given day, 
ArcaEx has a billion shares on or near the national best bid or offer. Yet on any given 
day, the NYSE sends only 2 million shares to ArcaEx over ITS when we have the best 
price. 
   We have confronted the NYSE with our voluminous data but to no avail. If, in the 
NYSE’s own words, the trade through rule “serves to protect investors,” the NYSE has 
some “splaining” to do and needs to take corrective action forthwith to enforce and 
comply with the trade through rule in its own marketplace. 
Market Structure III: The Role of the Specialist in the Evolving Modern Marketplace: Hearing 
before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of 
the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (Feb. 20, 2004) (written statement of 
Gerald Dean Putnam, Chairman & Chief Operating Officer, Archipelago Holdings, L.L.C.), 
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/022004gp.pdf. 
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price parameters were triggered—the so-called “Liquidity Replenishment 
Points” (a term possibly suggestive of kegs dotted around the NYSE floor 
to which thirsty members, beer mugs in hand, could repair).31 
Notwithstanding these developments and the NYSE’s efforts to 
maintain a grip on the order flow in NYSE-listed securities, the NYSE’s 
share of that order flow began to decline precipitously during the time the 
SEC was considering Regulation NMS, from a high of about 80% to just 
under 70%.32 Member firms, in turn, began to reduce the number of their 
employees on the NYSE floor.33 This effect seems to have resulted largely 
in greater competition from Nasdaq, whose registration as a national 
securities exchange had finally been approved by the SEC.34 It certainly did 
not result from the effectiveness of Regulation NMS, which even today is 
still unfolding. In any event, the NYSE has thus far been unable to reverse 
that trend. It may be that the gradual conversion of the market to electronic 
media from what had been the last vestige of a floor-based system among 
                                                                                                                 
 31. These various special advantages, which were soundly criticized to no avail by several 
commenters, preserved many of the time-and-place advantages the floor had previously enjoyed, 
at the expense of public investors, and they may have substantially reduced the likelihood that 
other markets would be able to offer meaningful competition to the NYSE specialists. See, e.g., 
Letter from Ari Burstein, Assoc. Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst., to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (July 20, 
2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/nyse200405/aburstein072005.pdf; Letter 
from Kim Bang, President and CEO, Bloomberg Tradebook LLC, to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC 
(Sept. 22, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/nyse200405/kbang092204.pdf; 
Letter from Eric D. Roiter, Senior Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Fidelity Investments, to 
Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Oct. 26, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ 
s71004/fidelity102504.pdf (giving trading examples that demonstrated graphically the unfairness 
of the NYSE rules). 
 32. See Roger Aitken, Technology Equity Markets—Big Players Set To Flex Their 
 Muscles, Sept. 1, 2006; see also Historical NYSE Group Monthly Volume, available at 
http://www.nyse.com/financials/1143717022567.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2007). 
 33. See, e.g., Aaron Lucchetti, The NYSE: Faster (and Lonelier), WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2007, 
at C1. 
For some traders left working on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange, it appears 
the Big Board has dimmed the lights. The exchange, a unit of NYSE Group Inc., is 
scheduled to finish today its long push to have its 3,618 securities traded almost 
exclusively electronically, a move that is translating into speedy service for investors. 
But for the employees on the NYSE’s iconic trading floor it means fewer jobs and the 
biggest change to the way the Big Board has traded stocks in its 214-year history. 
Every day more of the human brokers disappear. Big brokerage firms like Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc. and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. have let go some floor brokers in 
recent weeks, between five and 10 people each. Merrill Lynch & Co. has discussed 
with its brokers the possibility of transferring off the exchange. 
Id. 
 34. See David Gaffen & Scott Patterson, Yours is Mine and Mine Yours, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 
2007, at C6; In the Matter of the Application of the Nasdaq Stock Market, Exchange Act Release 
No. 66,572, 71 Fed. Reg. 3550 (Jan. 23, 2006). 
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equity exchanges has finally broken the NYSE’s ability to use its regulatory 
powers to defeat competition. Of course, only time will tell whether that is 
the case. 
IV. THE FUTURE: THE MARKET DATA DEBATE 
Accompanying the market structure developments reflected in the 
debate over fragmentation and the Commission’s adoption of Regulation 
NMS has been considerable focus on the increasingly large revenues the 
exchange markets have extracted from market professionals and from 
investors by selling their market data in the form of quotations and last-sale 
data.35 The exchanges are required under Regulation NMS to make public 
the best bid and offer, and the last sale trade, on a continuous basis.36 
Regulation NMS does not require them to make depth-of-market quotations 
available, but several of the exchanges have been developing depth-of-
market products for sale to the public, at prices that have begun to stir up 
vigorous opposition, as discussed below. 
A. LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS 
In fashioning the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, which added 
the national market system provisions in section 11A of the Exchange Act, 
the Congress was alert to the risk that exchanges, as government-protected 
monopolies, could exert monopoly power over market data. It warned that 
the exchanges—if allowed to continue to have monopoly powers—should 
be regulated as public utilities: 
The [Senate Banking] Committee believes that if economics and sound 
regulation dictate the establishment of an exclusive central processor for 
the composite tape or any other element of the national market system, 
provision must be made to insure that this central processor is not under 
the control or domination of any particular market center. Any exclusive 
processor is, in effect, a public utility, and thus it must function in a 
manner which is absolutely neutral with respect to all market centers, all 
market makers, and all private firms. Although the existence of a 
monopolistic processing facility does not necessarily raise antitrust 
problems, serious antitrust questions would be posed if access to this 
facility and its services were not available on reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory terms to all in the trade or if its charges were not 
reasonable. Therefore, in order to foster efficient market development and 
                                                                                                                 
 35. See generally Letter from Michael Atkin, Vice President, Fin. Info. Serv. Div. (FISD), 
Software & Info. Indus. Ass’n (SIIA), to Joel Seligman, Advisory Comm. on Mkt. Info., SEC 
(Apr. 2, 2001), available at http://www.fisd.net/mdregulation/sec_040201.asp (detailing the issues 
and considerations in the market data debate). 
 36. 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(b) (2007). 
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operation and to provide a first line of defense against anti-competitive 
practices, Sections 11A(b) and (c)(1) would grant the SEC broad powers 
over any exclusive processor and impose on that agency a responsibility to 
assure the processor’s neutrality and the reasonableness of its charges in 
practice as well as in concept.37 
B. COMMISSION RESPONSE 
The Commission’s response to that severe admonition has been 
instructive. The Commission’s oversight of exchange fees, including 
market data fees, is accomplished through its power to review and either 
approve or disapprove exchange rules. Exchange Act section 19(b) requires 
the exchanges to file as proposed rule changes any rules setting fees, as well 
as any other rules granting or limiting access to exchange facilities.38 
Exchange rules setting dues, fees, and other charges can become effective 
upon filing with the SEC.39 However, the Commission traditionally expects 
the exchanges to file fee rules for ordinary course notice and public 
comment before taking effect if the fees are payable by anyone other than 
members of the exchange.40 The Commission is required, with respect to 
fee rules, to determine whether the rates are “fair and reasonable” and “not 
unreasonably discriminatory” and whether the exchanges’ rules provide for 
the “equitable allocation of reasonable . . . fees . . . among its members and 
issuers and other persons using its facilities.41 
For many years, the Commission’s oversight of exchange market data 
fees was benign and not vigorous. In a Concept Release issued in 1999, the 
Commission discussed the legal standards applicable to its review of such 
fees: 
Terms such as ‘fair,’ ‘reasonable,’ and ‘equitable’ often need standards to 
guide their application in practice. One standard commonly used to 
evaluate the fairness and reasonableness of fees, particularly those of a 
monopolistic provider of a service, is the amount of costs incurred to 
provide the service. Some type of cost-based standard is necessary in the 
monopoly context because, on the one hand, it precludes the excessive 
                                                                                                                 
 37. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 11–12 (1975) (emphasis added). 
 38. See Exchange Act Rule 19b-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (2006). The Commission’s power to 
review exchange rules extends to regulatory provisions having to do with access to exchange 
facilities regardless of whether the provision is called a rule or is, for example, embedded in a 
contract the exchange requires those accessing its facilities to sign. See In the Matter of 
Bloomberg L.P., Exchange Act Release No. 49,076, 2004 SEC LEXIS 79 (Jan. 14, 2004). 
 39. Exchange Act § 19(b)(3)(A)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2000). 
 40. See Annual Filing of Amendments to Registration Statements of National Securities 
Exchanges, Securities Associations, and Reports and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, 
Exchange Act Release No. 35,123, 59 Fed. Reg. 66,692, 66,697 (Dec. 28, 1994). 
 41. See Exchange Act § 6(b)(4), 15 U.S.C.§ 78f(4) (2000); Exchange Act § 11A(c)(1)(C)(D), 
15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(c)(1)(C)(D) (2000); see also 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(a)(2) (3) (2007). 
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profits that would result if revenues were allowed to far outstrip costs, and, 
on the other hand, it precludes underfunding of a service if the revenues 
were held far below costs (or subsidization of the service by other sources 
of revenues).42 
At the same time, the Commission admitted that its approach had been 
basically limited to seeing whether anyone objected to fees and, if not, 
allowing them. “In this context, the Commission has relied to a great extent 
on the ability of the SROs and Plans to negotiate fees that are acceptable to 
SRO members, information vendors, investors, and other interested 
parties.”43 The Commission began using this approach of regulating fees 
shortly after the 1975 Amendments were enacted.44 
The Commission did not change course or develop new approaches in 
light of the comment on its Concept Release, much of which was directed at 
SRO fees. It suggested that the fees should relate to costs, and that the only 
allowable costs should be the costs of “collecting, consolidating, and 
distributing the data.”45 The Commission subsequently published a Market 
Data Advisory Committee Report46 whose majority recommendations were 
largely consistent with those of the exchange representatives on the 
Committee who wrote the report; it resulted in a strong dissent by others 
who had different views. Then, in a concept release issued in 2004 on the 
regulation and governance of exchanges and other self-regulatory organi-
zations, the SEC reminded itself that it would be necessary to return to the 
subject of market data fees.47 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Regulation of Market Information Fees and Revenues, Exchange Act Release No. 42,208, 
64 Fed. Reg. 70, 613, 70,619 (Dec. 17, 1999). 
 43. Id. at 70,622. This might be analogized to a local zoning board that approves applications 
for variances, finding them to be justified to relieve “undue hardships,” on the basis that the 
neighbors did not object. Today, as noted below, in the Commission’s case, even when objections 
are raised by the neighbors, they do not seem to matter. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See, e.g., Letter from Eric D. Roiter, Fidelity Invs., to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 25, 
2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s72899/roiter1.htm; Letter from W. Hardy 
Callcott, Senior Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., to Jonathan Katz, 
Sec’y, SEC (July 10, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s72899/callcot1.htm; 
Letter from Marc E. Lackritz, President, Sec. Indus. Ass’n, to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 
11, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s72899/lackrit1.htm. (Following its 
merger with The Bond Market Association, the Securities Industry Association is known as the 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association.) See also Letter from Lou Eccleston, 
Bloomberg L.P., to SEC (Apr. 11, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s72899/ 
ecclest1.htm. 
 46. See Letter from Joel Seligman, Dean and Ethan A.H. Shepley University Professor, 
Washington University School of Law, to SEC, Report of the Advisory Committee on Market 
Information: A Blueprint for Responsible Change (Sept. 14, 2001), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/marketinfo/finalreport.htm. 
 47. Concept Release on Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 50,700 (Nov. 18, 2004). 
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C. CHANGES IN THE EXCHANGES’ COMPOSITION 
No discussion of this topic would be complete without a reference to 
the economic climate affecting the operation of exchange markets and their 
governance. The economics of exchanges were changing rapidly and 
dramatically. During Arthur Levitt’s tenure as Commission Chairman 
(1993–2001),48 the Commission pressured the exchanges to reconstitute 
their boards of directors to dramatically reduce the representation of 
exchange members.49 Soon thereafter, the major exchanges converted from 
being cooperative not-for-profit organizations into for-profit organizations 
with publicly traded securities. That gave them the usual private sector 
incentives to use their powers to maximize their revenues, crush their 
competitors, and increase their share prices. They swiftly bought up their 
largest competitors—INET and BRUT, in the case of Nasdaq, and the 
ARCA Exchange, in the case of the NYSE—and, proposing to use their 
now public stock as an acquisition currency, set out to acquire exchanges in 
Europe and elsewhere.50 
While the change in the constitution of exchanges was accompanied by 
dramatic increases in their market power, it was not accompanied by any 
change in the Exchange Act standards applicable to them. By law, they 
continue to be subject to a statutory regime that never contemplated that 
they would be publicly owned, for-profit companies. The monopoly powers 
they continue to enjoy give them increasing incentives to branch out into 
adjacent markets, such as value-added products, using the market data to 
which they enjoy monopoly access. In addition they can charge whatever 
the traffic will bear, effectively monopoly rents, for market data.51 By 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See SEC Biography: Chairman Arthur Levitt, http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/ 
levitt.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2007). 
 49. Paula Dwyer, Arthur Levitt’s Hardball at the SEC, BUS. WK., Sept. 29, 1997, at 50, 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/@@U@zn52YQG27gWQYA/1997/39/b3546087.htm. 
Notably, the NYSE did not change the structure of its board until 2003, after Chairman Levitt was 
gone. See, e.g., NYSE Board Members to Resign From Other Boards, FORBES.COM, June 5, 2003, 
http://www.forbes.com/newswire/2003/06/05/rtr992168.html; Stephen Labaton, Big Board Over-
haul Plan Faulted, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2003, at C1. 
 50. See Aaron Lucchetti & Alistair McDonald, Euronext Holders Approve Deal for Historic 
Merger with NYSE, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2006, at C3; Aaron Lucchetti & Eric Bellman, NYSE 
Extends Reach to India, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2007, at C3; Gaston F. Ceron, NYSE and Tokyo Tie 
a Knot, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2007, at C2; Edward Taylor & Alistair McDonald, Exchanges Step 
Up Chase for Foreign Mates, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2007, at C5; Alistair McDonald, Nasdaq Fails 
in Hostile Takeover Bid for London Stock Exchange, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Feb. 11, 2007. 
 51. Petition for Commission Review from Markham C. Erickson, Executive Dir. and Gen. 
Counsel, NetCoalition.com, to SEC, Regarding Exchange Act Release No. 54,597, at 14 (Nov. 14, 
2006), available at http://www.netcoalition.com/vertical/Sites/%7BF1D948CC-5797-482E-B502-
743C873E2848%7D/uploads/%7B2DE79A1C-7CFE-4DD8-BE12-EAEF3CE234C6%7D.PDF 
[hereinafter NetCoalition.com Petition]; Letter from Sanjiv Gupta, Bloomberg L.P., to Nancy 
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federalizing a duty of best execution, the Commission deprived exchange 
members and their fiduciary customers of the ability to control market data 
prices. They were ill-equipped to decline to buy the market data the 
exchanges sell at ever increasing prices, along with their value-added 
products. In particular, when offered data products by the exchanges that 
regulate them, many broker-dealers decide it is prudent to buy “protection” 
from their regulators.52 The Commission’s Market Data Study concluded 
that the Commission should not require exchanges to publish depth-of-book 
data; the exchanges interpreted this as license to sell the data for whatever 
they could get.53 
                                                                                                                 
Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/34-
55011/3455011-5.pdf. 
 52. Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association made this point forcefully in a 
comment letter in response to a recent petition by NetCoalition, discussed post, concerning staff 
approval of market data fees: 
[T]he Commission has been placing increasing emphasis on the duty of best execution. 
Regulation NMS itself was designed, in large part, to support the duty of best 
execution. The Commission and the SROs have conducted repeated examination 
sweeps of broker-dealers’ execution quality committees, to assure that those 
committees are adequately considering the execution quality data required by former 
Rule 11Ac1-5 (now Regulation NMS Rule 605). Similar examination sweeps have 
sought to assure that broker-dealers’ order routing information, required by former Rule 
11Ac1-6 (now Regulation NMS Rule 606) also is accurate. Still other widely 
publicized examination sweeps and enforcement investigations have reviewed very 
particularized elements of broker-dealers’ order-routing practices, for example why 
some broker-dealers did not make use of a particular market’s “opening cross” 
methodology. . . . As a result of these trends, broker-dealers and other securities market 
participants have become convinced that it is prudent to buy any number of single-
exchange “depth-of-book” market data products that arguably could assist them in 
meeting their best execution obligations. . . .When the major SROs tell their member 
firms that a particular market data product facilitates better executions, those member 
firms understandably feel pressure to buy that market data product, regardless of their 
own evaluation of the merits of that product. As a result of these trends, many broker-
dealers and other market participants have come to the conclusion that it is prudent to 
purchase and evaluate single-market “depth-of-book” market data, at least from the 
major markets, so there can be no doubt they have met their duty of best execution. 
Letter from Ira Hammerman, Senior Managing Dir. and Gen. Counsel, Sec. Ind. and Fin. Mkts. 
Ass’n, to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC, Regarding In the Matter of NetCoalition, File No. SR-NYSE 
Arca-2006-21, at 14 (Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/34-55011/ 
3455011-6.pdf [hereinafter Hammerman January 17, 2007 Letter]. 
 53. See, e.g., Letter from Exchange Market Data Coalition (The American Stock Exchange, 
The Boston Stock Exchange, The Chicago Board Options Exchange, The Chicago Stock 
Exchange, The International Securities Exchange, The NASDAQ Stock Market, The New York 
Stock Exchange, The NYSE/Arca Exchange, and The Philadelphia Stock Exchange), to Nancy 
Morris, Sec’y, SEC 5–6 (Jan. 26, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/34-55011/ 
3455011-9.pdf. 
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D. NEW BUSINESS MOTIVATIONS OF THE EXCHANGES 
The SEC Division of Market Regulation, meanwhile, continued to 
process exchange market data fee filings and to approve them by delegated 
authority,54 regardless of the change in economic circumstances or other 
considerations bearing on the fairness and reasonableness of rates.55 The 
Commission was not wholly unaware of the conflicts between regulatory 
power and the commercial impulses that the newly for-profit exchanges 
were beginning to exhibit. For example, the SEC did tell Nasdaq, in the 
order granting Nasdaq’s registration as a national securities exchange, that 
it could not lawfully use OATS data (regulatory data gathered from Nasdaq 
members) for commercial (i.e., non-regulatory) purposes. Further, the SEC 
defined clear and unambiguous boundaries to what it would constitute 
commercial use of OATS data: 
Nasdaq responded to commenters’ concerns [that Nasdaq should not be 
permitted to use OATS data for non-regulatory purposes] by reaffirming 
its commitment not to use OATS data for commercial purposes. Nasdaq, 
however, believes that its use of OATS data by Nasdaq’s Department of 
Economic Research to study public policy issues, such as sub-penny 
trading and decimalization, does not constitute commercial use of the data. 
The Commission believes that any non-regulatory use of the data would 
have a commercial benefit.56 
Gentle reminders were not enough. Notwithstanding the Commission’s 
admonition, Nasdaq soon thereafter filed for immediate effectiveness a 
package of rule changes and told the Commission the rules were “non-
controversial.”57 However, the rules contravened what the Commission had 
                                                                                                                 
 54. The Commission has delegated to its Division of Market Regulation the SEC’s authority 
under Exchange Act section 19(b) to approve SRO rules. See 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-3(a)(12) (2007). 
Exchange Act section 4A delineates the Commission’s power to delegate functions to its staff. 
That power does not extend to adopting SEC rules, but exchange rules are approved by order, not 
by rule. Nonetheless, NetCoalition has raised questions whether in fact the staff’s issuance of 
“long orders, disputing public comment and reaching policy judgments, such as those at issue 
here, that have not been blessed by the Commissioners themselves” is consistent with the staff’s 
delegated powers. Letter from Markham C. Erickson, Executive Dir. and Gen. Counsel, 
NetCoalition.com, to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC 11 (Mar. 6, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/34-55011/3455011-16.pdf. 
 55. See NetCoalition.com Petition, supra note 51. 
 56. In the Matter of the Application of the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC for Registration as a 
National Securities Exchange; Findings, Opinion, and Order of the Commission, Exchange Act 
Release No. 53,128, 71 Fed. Reg. 3550, 3558 n.133 (Jan. 13, 2006) (noting the approval of 
Nasdaq exchange registration). 
 57. Pursuant to paragraph (f)(6) of Rule 19b-4, added in 1994, an exchange may file a rule 
change for immediate effectiveness if the rule “[d]oes not significantly affect the protection of 
investors or the public interest” and “[d]oes not impose any significant burden on competition.”  
17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4(f)(6)(i), (ii) (2006). 
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told the Nasdaq that it should not do, thereby effectively flouting the 
Commission’s express directive. The Nasdaq rules include OATS data as 
well as a proposed analytics package that includes share data not visible in 
its existing quotation and order data feeds or in its quotation montage.58 
Public criticism of that filing was swift and fierce,59 but the 60-day 
period for summary abrogation60 was allowed to expire without the Com-
mission acting to curb Nasdaq’s rules. The Commission neither effectively 
prevented Nasdaq from using its regulatory muscle to nourish its 
commercial ventures nor punished Nasdaq for flouting the Commission’s 
policy. 
V. NETCOALITION.COM’S PETITION: CHALLENGING THE 
OLD ORDER 
Not long thereafter push came to shove, but not directly from the 
Commission. NYSE Arca, following in Nasdaq’s footsteps, filed a package 
of rule changes establishing fees for value-added data to which there was 
equal, if not more powerful, objection.61 The Division of Market Regulation 
approved those rules.62 The prospect of the NYSE, as the dominant 
securities exchange, commercializing regulatory data that Arca had pre-
viously provided without charge led to a most unusual step by the industry. 
NetCoalition.com, a trade group whose trustees include CNET Networks, 
Bloomberg L.P., Google, IAC/Interactive Corp. and Yahoo!, filed a petition 
under a little-used provision of the Commission’s Rules of Practice—Rule 
                                                                                                                 
 58. See Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change and 
Amendment No. 1 To Establish a Package of Real-Time and Near-Real-Time Data Products 
Called the Market Analytics Data Package, Exchange Act Release No. 54,003, 71 Fed. Reg. 
36,141 (June 16, 2006). 
 59. See Letter from Gregory Babyak, Chairman, Mkt. Data Subcomm. of the SIA Tech. and 
Regulation Comm. & Christopher Gilkerson, Chairman, SIA Tech. and Regulation Comm., to 
Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (July 14, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-
2006-056/nasd2006056-2.pdf; Letter from Markham C. Erickson, Executive Dir. and Gen. 
Counsel, NetCoalition.com, to Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC (Aug. 9, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2006-056/mcerickson080906.pdf; Letter from Bruce 
Garland, Bloomberg L.P., to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (July 14, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2006-056/nasd2006056-1.pdf; Letter from Sanjiv Gupta, 
Bloomberg L.P., to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Aug. 22, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/sr-nasd-2006-056/nasd2006056-4.pdf. 
 60. The second sentence of Exchange Act § 19(b)(3)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(C) (2000), 
allows the Commission sixty days from the date of filing to abrogate summarily any exchange rule 
that became effective upon filing. 
 61. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to Approval of Market Data Fees for 
NYSE Arca Data, Exchange Act Release No. 53,952, 71 Fed. Reg. 33,496 (June 9, 2006). 
 62. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to NYSE Arca Data, Exchange Act 
Release No. 54,597, 71 Fed. Reg. 62,029 (Oct. 20, 2006) (approving the rule on October 12, 
2006). 
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43063—asking the Commission to review and set aside the staff’s action in 
approving NYSE Arca’s rules.64 NetCoalition argued basically five things: 
1. NYSE Arca’s fees are excessive and put access to NYSE Arca data, 
which had been free before Arca’s merger with the NYSE, well 
beyond the reasonable economic reach of advertiser-sponsored 
media such as the Internet websites sponsored by NetCoalition’s 
trustee Internet Service Providers (ISPs). 
2. NYSE Arca’s fees are not “fair and reasonable” and the Commission 
cannot so conclude in the absence of any data as to the cost of 
collecting, consolidating and distributing those data. 
3. NYSE Arca failed to comply with the Commission’s own Form 19b-
4 since it did not discuss or give any justification for burdens on 
competition its fees would impose. 
4. NYSE Arca is making anticompetitive and inappropriate use of its 
monopoly powers to enter and control downstream markets, such as 
the market for data analytics and other value-added products and 
services. 
5. NYSE Arca is making inappropriate use of regulatory data to which 
it has exclusive access to foster the development of commercial 
products. 
The SEC staff recommended to the Commission that the petition to 
review the staff action be granted—possibly, one might surmise, because a 
conclusion had been reached that the record on appeal would be rather weak 
unless the Commission granted the petition and gave further consideration 
to the issues at hand.65 In any event, the Commission granted the petition 
unanimously at the end of 2006 and opened up a 21-day comment period, 
running, not as usual from the Federal Register publication of the order, but 
from the date of the order itself, which was issued during the Christmas 
holiday.66 
                                                                                                                 
 63. 17 C.F.R. § 201.430 (2004). 
 64. NetCoalition.com Petition, supra note 51. Under SEC Rule of Practice 431(e), 17 C.F.R. 
§ 201.431(e) (2004), the filing of such a petition automatically stays the effectiveness of the 
challenged staff action. See Alan Sipress, Internet Firms Seek Rollback of Quote Fees: Coalition 
to Ask SEC to Reconsider Charges for Posting Real-Time Stock Prices, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 
2006, at D5; Jed Horowitz, Internet Forms Seek SEC Review of Stock Exchanges’ Data Fees, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2006, at C4. 
 65. Exchange Act § 25(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (2000), provides for a direct appeal to the 
United States Court of Appeals of SEC final orders. 
 66. In the Matter of NetCoalition, Exchange Act Release No. 55,011, 2006 SEC LEXIS 3016 
(Dec. 27, 2006) (order granting petition and scheduling filing of statements). 
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The public reaction has been substantial.67 SIFMA strongly supported 
the NetCoalition petition and urged the Commission to reverse the staff 
decision on the grounds urged by NetCoalition and also to impose a 
moratorium on future exchange market data rule filings: 
The price of market data has a direct impact on its availability and on who 
can access it. In order for an exchange to justify a market data rule 
proposal as “fair and reasonable,” “not unreasonably discriminatory” and 
representing “an equitable allocation of costs” as required by the 
Exchange Act, the Commission should require the exchanges to submit 
information regarding the exchange’s cost to collect, consolidate and 
distribute that market data. The Commission should make it clear that the 
exchanges may take into account only their legitimate costs in producing 
the market data that they control. However, exchanges may not use their 
control to charge unfair or unreasonable fees for the market data at a level 
that would enable them to cross-subsidize their competitive operations.68 
One significant point SIFMA made was that NYSE Arca and other 
exchanges are beginning to develop, even for the publicly mandated Best 
Bid and Offer data, streaming technology that operates markedly faster than 
the public utility data stream offered by Securities Industry Automation 
Corporation and thus will truly promote a two-tiered market in which 
“smart” investors—hedge funds and others—will have an inside track that 
will leave the average investor in the dust, an inside track resulting in part 
from the Commission’s own emphasis on “best execution”: 
[T]he process through which the SIPs consolidate quotes from different 
markets takes a certain amount of time (especially since the exchange 
administrators of the SIPs have little if any financial incentive to invest 
money to modernize their operations). As a result, some markets—
including (as relevant in this petition) the NYSE and NYSE Arca—now 
advertise that their unconsolidated market data products are faster than the 
consolidated market data feeds. These markets (again, including the 
NYSE) also advertise that their market data products therefore offer better 
order execution opportunities than the consolidated market data feeds.69 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See SEC, Comments on Order Granting Petition for Review and Scheduling Filing of 
Statements (Exchange Act Release No. 55,011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/34-
55011/3455011.shtml (last visited Mar. 27, 2007). 
 68. Hammerman January 17, 2007 Letter, supra note 52. 
 69. Id. at 13–14. SIFMA quoted NYSE Arca’s promotional materials, which emphasized that 
the new data feed would be on a fast track 60 times faster than the slow-track data made generally 
available to the public and would provide six times the liquidity. 
The ArcaBook data feed provides real time, depth of book limit order information for 
NYSE Arca and ArcaEdge (OTCBB). By receiving the information directly from the 
source, ArcaBook clients are able to receive order information approximately 60 times 
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SIFMA also advised the Commission that it should address the risk that 
the exchanges would leverage their positions as government-sponsored 
monopolies to enter and dominate competition in adjacent markets, namely, 
the markets for value-added data products: 
The Commission should explore structural alternatives that would 
introduce competition in value added market data products as a 
supplement to, or even substitute for, cost-based regulation. The 
exchanges compete today for listings, investment products, and services 
they provide to traders and other users of an exchange. The Commission 
should encourage a structure in which they can compete also in the area of 
market data products. Today, however, they use exclusive control over 
basic market data (facts about orders and quotes submitted by broker-
dealers) to package simple consolidation as a “product” for which they 
charge a fee unconstrained by market forces. A structural alternative for a 
new market data framework could include requiring each exchange to 
place market data operations in a separate subsidiary, and requiring each 
exchange to sell raw market data on the same terms to third parties as it 
does to its own subsidiary.70 
The advantages enjoyed by exchanges in setting their fees amounted, 
according to several commenters, to a complete absence of any external 
control, from the Commission, from market forces or anywhere else. The 
Financial Services Roundtable observed: 
The most significant deterioration in market data price controls . . . has 
been the change in ownership structure at the exchanges. Rather than 
continuing as member-owned, not for-profit enterprises, nearly all U.S. 
exchanges have migrated to shareholder-owned, for profit corporations. 
Exchange management owes its fiduciary duties to the shareholders of the 
corporation and those duties include maximizing the revenue generated by 
market data fees. Brokers and users of the exchanges, while often owning 
shares in the exchange corporations, are far less capable of constraining 
the fee levels. This is particularly true of market data fees because 
exchanges retain government-sponsored control over the sale of market 
data. Exchange transaction fees are subject to competitive pressures 
among the competing markets. However, market data is consolidated 
                                                                                                                 
faster than they can through the securities information processor (SIP) and see 6 times 
the liquidity within five cents of the inside quote that is offered by the market inside. 
NYSE ARCA, ARCABOOK—FEE TRANSITION FACT SHEET, quoted in id. at 14 n.24 (emphasis 
added). 
 70. Hammerman January 17, 2007 Letter, supra note 52, at 8–9. 
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among the exchanges prior to sale and the exchanges share in the 
proceeds. No mechanism for competition exists for this product.71 
VI. SIGNIFICANCE OF MARKET DATA TO EXCHANGES AND 
TO THE PUBLIC 
Why is all of this important? Market data have often been called the 
“oxygen” of the markets. The Congress emphasized in 1975 that if 
exchanges were allowed to become or remain the sole source of market 
data, they should be subject to strict regulatory control to curb burdens on 
competition and to ensure the fairness and reasonableness of pricing. In the 
more than thirty years since then, the exchanges have been allowed to 
justify their fees not on the basis of the costs of collecting, consolidating, 
and distributing the data, which are probably relatively trivial—SIFMA has 
calculated on the basis of the Commission’s own numbers that the 
exchanges extract a 1,000 percent mark-up over those costs72—but on the 
basis of comparing their fees against market data fees charged by other 
exchanges, which some commenters have suggested amounts to comparing 
one monopoly rent against another.73 From time to time, the exchanges have 
adverted the notion that they have property rights in the data originating on 
their facilities, a proposition NetCoalition disputes vigorously in its petition, 
citing Feist v. Rural Service Telephone Company, Inc.74 and the NYSE’s 
unsuccessful efforts to get the Congress to adopt legislation overturning the 
case law.75 
To the exchanges themselves, revenues from market data are a 
substantial portion of their overall revenues. In fact, the Commission 
acknowledged that market data fees were a substantial part of the overall 
revenues of the exchanges. In its 1999 Concept Release on Regulation of 
Market Information Fees and Revenues, the Commission reported that for 
1998 the NYSE had received $111.5 million from the sale of market 
information, 15.3% of its total 1998 revenues of $728.7 million, while the 
NASD in that year had received $152.3 million from the sale of market 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Letter from Richard M. Whiting, Executive Dir. and Gen. Counsel, The Fin. Services 
Roundtable, to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
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 72. Hammerman January 17, 2007 Letter, supra note 52, at 3. 
 73. See Letter by Gregory Babyak, Chairman, Market Data Subcomm. of the SIA Tech. and 
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information, 21.7% of its total 1998 revenues of $699.8 million.76 The 
NYSE Group’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for 2005 reported that, for 
that year, the NYSE received $178.2 million from the sale of market 
information, 15.9% of its total 2005 revenues (net of section 31 fees) of 
$1,123.1 million. Nasdaq does not disclose the components in its Annual 
Report on Form 10-K for 2005 the components of a revenue category it 
calls “market services,”77 but reported that, for the third quarter of 2006 
ended September 30 of that year, Nasdaq received $38.6 million from the 
sale of “market services subscriptions,” 22.5% of its total 2005 net revenues 
of $171.2 million.78 These numbers show that market data fees account for 
a significant portion of these two exchanges’ revenues, which affects their 
market capitalization and thus the value of their stock, including its value as 
an acquisition currency. 
The exchanges certainly need revenues for public purposes such as 
market regulation, but traditionally there has been no effort to demonstrate 
how the market data revenues serve that purpose. SIFMA has asserted that 
market data fees should not go to pay those costs and that SIFMA’s 
members would be willing to be charged separately for the costs of 
exchange regulation.79 The absence of any real control on those costs, and 
the compulsion the Commission itself imposed on broker-dealers and 
investment managers to seek out “best execution” possibilities have 
removed, as the commenters suggested, any semblance of market discipline 
or market forces controlling such costs.80 The congressional admonition in 
the 1975 Amendments to impose utility-type regulation on the exchanges to 
curb their abuses of monopoly powers—at a time when they remained 
cooperative, not-for-profit entities—seems not to have borne fruit. 
The NetCoalition petition to the SEC Commissioners is an effort not 
only to prevent the creation of the two-tiered market structure, but also to 
prevent the exchanges from dominating both the securities and adjunct 
value-added data markets through the use of their privileged, monopoly 
access to market data. That the Commission granted the NetCoalition 
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petition was certainly an unusual event. The SEC is not in the habit of 
granting petitions to review staff action taken by delegated authority. 
Indeed, there have been no other significant instances in which such a 
petition has been granted.81 The issues involved, and the fact that the 
securities industry—represented by SIFMA—and several of the major 
Internet web operators—represented by NetCoalition—have lined up 
against the SEC staff and urged the Commission to reverse its staff, is 
certainly a first. The Commission has a real opportunity in this instance to 
deal with these important issues and to provide leadership to the markets, 
and to its staff.82 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Letter from Markham C. Erickson, Executive Dir. and Gen. Counsel, NetCoalition.com, to 
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 82. The American Bar Association’s Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, in a 
comment letter on the NetCoalition petition, emphasized the importance of the issues facing the 
Commission: 
With this trend away from self governance, exchange members are afforded less of an 
opportunity to act as a check on SRO rules, including those relating to market data fees, 
to ensure that they are designed  
to promote just and equitable principles of trade, . . . to remove impediments 
to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national 
market system, and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest; 
and are not designed to permit unfair discrimination between customers, 
issuers, brokers or dealers. 
In recent years, greater pressure has been placed on this analysis as SROs have 
transformed themselves to compete with their broker-dealer members for market share 
and trading volume. Thus, although SROs remain largely the exclusive purveyors of 
market information for their associated exchanges, they are no longer necessarily 
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The Committee urges the Commission to tackle comprehensively the issues of SRO 
governance and funding, including the associated issue of market data fees. 
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The policy issues involved are complex, but the fundamental question 
is whether the Commission will reject the approval of fees on the basis of 
comparing one monopoly rent to another and call the exchanges to task for 
using their market power to muscle their way into, and potentially 
dominate, adjacent markets. The public interest is substantially and 
inexorably involved in both issues. 
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